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Thesis Abstract 
Nowadays, personal mobile devices, such as PDAs and cell phones, are becoming more 
and more popular. With the new advancement in industrial technologies, mobile devices can 
support more advanced applications. Computational intensive applications such as those for 
biometric and multimedia purposes are now deployed to these devices. Among these different 
applications, mobile payment is one of the most important applications in mobile platform. 
With the ubiquitous characteristic of mobile devices, mobile payment provides flexibility to 
users as they can access the devices anywhere at any time. However, authentication is a 
critical security concern in the mobile payment system. It is especially important for those 
commercial activities involving monetary transfers. Hence a low cost prototype secure mobile 
device, which is capable for handling fingerprint and smart card, is proposed here to enhance 
the security of the mobile systems. 
To evaluate the performance of our proposed mobile security system, a Penalty Ticket 
Payment System (FTPS) is developed on top of our constructed device. Different secure 
modules are implemented in FTPS so that different parties can communicate with each other 
via a security channel. Experiments are conducted to evaluate the performance of the secure 
modules in mobile platform. Results show that our mobile security system can be deployed to 
PTPS efficiently and it can achieve real time performance. 
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1. Mobile Commerce 
1.1 Introduction to Mobile Commerce 
Mobile commerce is one of important commercial activities nowadays. It often 
involves the use of mobile devices when making transactions. Mobile commerce is quite 
different from the traditional electronic commerce. Electronic commerce is a more 
general term to define the type of commercial activity conducted in an electronic world. 
However, mobile commerce emphasizes the wireless way of conducting transactions. 
Therefore mobile commerce is a subset of electronic commerce. The use of mobile 
devices in mobile commerce makes a significant change in our computer paradigm. The 
ubiquitous environment in our real life has a great impact on our living style. We can 
use the mobile device to interact with other devices or computers anywhere at anytime. 
However this significant change makes a great challenge to the security issue. The uses 
of mobile devices are quite different from fixed-location devices (e.g. desktop personal 
computers). There will be security holes without a well designed authentication 
technique and control access schemes [23]. We will have a more detailed discussion 
about the security issue in a later part of the thesis. 
The ways of conducting transactions in mobile commerce give more flexibility to 
the users. With the mobile devices, users can enjoy the mobile services provided from 
the suppliers in real time. For example, a user can buy or sell a stock at a certain price 
immediately. Or he can make a bill payment that will overdue a few minutes later. 
Mobile users can receive and interact with the services content at an instant in different 
ways like HTML (HyperText Markup Language) [17] and SMS (Short Message 
Service) [53]. Therefore.with more and more applications deploying to the mobile 
world, customers can enjoy a higher quality of services. 
Mobile commerce applications become more and more popular and important 
because the number of mobile users has grown rapidly from four million in 2000 to 
twelve million in 2002 [42]. There are many kinds of mobile commerce applications 
that provided to the customer. According to [52], mobile commerce applications can be 
divided into three main categories, digital content delivery, telemetry service and 
transaction management. 
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Digital content delivery 
Digital content delivery refers to the transfer of requested information to the user. 
Information including weather, stock price, e-book, ticket availability and traffic status 
are some of the examples. Digital information can be delivered to a user who owns a 
network enabled mobile device. When more advanced equipment like high revolution 
LCD display and faster processor is used, information like MP3, video and digital map 
can be delivered via higher speed networks. 
Telemetry service 
Telemetry service is a new way of mobile application. Telemetry technology allows 
a user to control home appliances from a mobile device via a wireless network. 
However, this type of service is not very popular because IP-enabled home appliances 
are still a very new idea that requires the participation of numerous appliance vendors 
and the drafting of mutually agreed operation protocols. 
Transaction management 
r 
Transaction management is one type of mobile commerce service that is easier to 
deploy to the user. Online shopping and mobile purchasing are two examples. In 
transaction management service, a user can enjoy real time information browsing, 
product selection and purchasing. All steps can be completed via some small portable 
devices, giving great convenience to users to manage their transactions. 
Among the above three categories of mobile commerce applications, security 
concerns in transaction management is the most important one because it involves a 
large amount of monetary transactions. Therefore we will further discuss the mobile 
payment systems for handling monetary transfers. 
1.2 Mobile commerce payment systems 
In traditional desktop-based electronic commerce, many payment systems are 
already available. However, as mentioned in [51], direct porting of such systems to 
mobile devices are not suitable. The unique characteristic of mobile commerce causes 
many difficulties in integrating with the traditional electronic payment systems. 
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Therefore, new types of mobile payment systems have been proposed to solve the 
problem. Basically, there are three types of mobile payment systems. They are software 
electronic coins, hardware electronic coins and background account payment system. 
Software electronic coins payment system 
Figure 1.1 shows the software electronic coins payment system. This type of 
payment system uses software to represent monetary value. Customers can purchase 
electronic coins and download them to mobile devices. A coin can be stored as a file 
with a serial number and expiry day. Whenever a customer employs a mobile device for 
a purchase operation using an electronic coin, the merchant software will retrieve the 
coin from the mobile device and forward it to the issuing bank. The bank will then 
check the validity of the serial number of the coin. If the coin is valid, the bank will 
deduct the purchasing value from the coin and transfer the amount to the merchant's 
account. H ~ ； Issuer/Bank 
Verifies software coins and �，. p / credits the merchant's ^ Credit software / ^ \ . / account \ coins / \ 
1 \ Request 
\ 。 一 
Mobile \ 
device ^  
Software Merchant 
coins ^ 
Figure 1.1: Software electronic coins payment system 
The disadvantage of this system is that the coin needs to be generated externally and 
then downloaded to the mobile device. This procedure is not convenient to the customer 
because the customer needs to go to the issuing bank for crediting the electronic coin. 
Speaking of security issue, the uniqueness of the electronic coin mainly depends on its 
serial number. Without a proper encryption to protect the serial number, it can be easily 
duplicated and used illegally. Besides, the customer is completely anonymous to the 
bank and merchant. That means no parties can identify who is using the electronic coin. 
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Therefore, the security level of authentication is weak, making it suitable for small 
amount of monetary transfers. 
Hardware electronic coins payment system 
Figure 1.2 shows a hardware electronic coins payment system. In this type of 
payment system, a hardware token like a smart card is often used to store the electronic 
coin. Using a smart card gives a great convenience to the customer because a smart card 
is easy to carry. In conducting a transaction, a customer only needs to connect his/her 
smart card, which is provided by the merchant, to the card terminal. The software from 
the merchant, which is provided from the card issuer, will check the validity of the smart 
card and deduct the purchasing amount from the card. The transaction log will then be 
sent to the bank and the bank will credit the merchant's account. There are several 
advantages in using this approach. Merchant can conduct transactions with customers 
directly and transfer the amounts to the issuing bank. Customer can add credit to the 
balance inside the smart card with an Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) directly. 
Besides, a hardware token (smart card) is difficult to duplicate [64] and it gives more 
pfotection to the customers. But the security protection in those systems is still not 
enough because no authentication procedure is involved. Using a hardware electronic 
coin like the Mondex card, does not require any authentication before conducting a 
transaction. That means anyone who picks up the card can use it for purchasing directly 
without any restrictions. 
Issuer/Bank 
Credits merchant's account 
according to transaction log 
一 
Customer Merchant 
‘ Verifies smart 
Smart card card 
Balance 
— ~ • 
Figure 1.2: Hardware electronic coins payment system 
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Background account payment system 
Figure 1.3 shows a background account payment system. In a background account 
payment system, a trusted third party who stores the account o f the customer is required 
to act as a mediator between the customer and the merchant. When the customer 
receives the invoice from the merchant, he or she w i l l send an authentication and 
authorisation messages to the merchant. The merchant w i l l then forward those messages 
to the trusted third party. The trusted third party w i l l verify the message and settle the 
transaction. Famous background account systems like the Secure Electronic 
Transactions (SET) belong to this category. In SET, a transaction is encrypted and 
digitally signed to prevent unauthorized attacks. The advantage o f using this type o f 
payment system is that the account is stored in a trusted third party. Unauthorized 
persons cannot access the account directly. In order to attack this type o f system, an 
attacker needs to send a fake message to the trusted third party. In this way, the security 
o f the system depends on the protection mechanism for the authentication and 
authorisation messages. 
Trusted third party 
Verifies authentication and 
authorization messages, and then 
credits merchant's account from 
customer's account 
Z^ T “ I T M e s s a g e s 
\ forwarding 
Authentication and \ 
authorization messages \  
Customer ―丨 Merchant 
Figure 1.3: Background account payment system 
1.3 Security in mobile commerce 
In the previous section, we have discussed different kinds of mobile commerce 
payment systems. Security in those payment systems is very important because it 
involves monetary values. Without a proper security measure, payment systems can be 
easily attacked. There are many known types of attack to payment systems [7]. To Department of Computer Science and Engineering iii 
protect against these attacks, security requirements on payment authentication, integrity, 
non-repudiation and confidentiality must be further considered [64]. 
Authentication 
Authentication is to ensure the identities of different parties that involved in the 
transactions. There are different types of authentication methodologies for different 
applications, for examples, password, smart card and biometric. Each methodology has 
its strengths and weakness. We will have a detailed discussion in a later part of this 
thesis. 
Integrity 
Integrity is to ensure that no unauthorized principals can modify the content of the 
transaction. Information inside the transaction including payer and payee identities, 
purchase details and other related information should ALL be protected. 
Non-repudiation 
r 
Non-repudiation is to ensure that once a customer has committed a transaction, he 
or she cannot deny it. A signature from the originator needs to be included in the 
transaction so as to provide a non-repudiation feature. 
Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is to ensure that transaction data will only be disclosed to the 
relevant parties during storage or transmission processes. A secret communication 
channel is needed during the transfer of data. Different pieces of information inside a 
single transaction are separately disclosed to different parties (e.g. SET) on a need-to-
know basis. This requirement adds further complication to the communication 
mechanism. 
In order to achieve the above four security requirements, a security technology, 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), is deployed in the world of electronic commerce. There 
are lots of cryptography technologies inside PKI. The main components include 
symmetric cryptography, asymmetric cryptography, digital signature and digital 
certificate. They are described in Figure 1.4 to 1.7 respectively [61] [4]. 
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In symmetric cryptography, a secret key is used to encrypt the plain text into cipher 
text. During data transmission, the cipher text is not viewable from an unauthorized 
party. Therefore, it provides data confidentiality. On the receiver side, the cipher text is 
decrypted using the same secret key to obtain the plain text. Both parties that involve in 
the process need to share the same secret key. Therefore, this method cannot guarantee 
authentication and data integrity. 
Plain text _ Plain text 
/ \ f 
� Encrypt / \ Decrypt 
Secret key ^ 
w 
Cipher text • Cipher text 
Data transmission 
Figure 1.4: Symmetric cryptography 
In asymmetric cryptography, two keys are used for encryption and decryption. 
Therefore it can provide key confidentiality. The two keys are mathematically related 
and generated by RSA algorithm [48]. Data encrypted with a public key can only be 
decrypted using a private key and vice versa. On the other hand, a private key is 
accessible by the owner only while a public key can be distributed to the public. 
Therefore, data encrypted with a public key can provide data confidentiality while a 
private key cannot. The advantage of this design is that no sharing of a key is necessary. 
Each party only needs to keep a private key for decrypting secret messages that are 
encrypted with corresponding public key. 
Plain text Plain text 
r ^  / ^ A t 
^ Encrypt / Public \ / Private \ Decrypt ^ 
\ r  
Cipher text • Cipher text 
Data transmission 
Figure 1.5: Asymmetric cryptography 
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In creating a digital signature, the plain text in a message is first hashed using a 
hash function [15]. The hashed plain text is signed by a private key to produce a 
signature. After the signature has been transmitted to the receiver side, the receiver uses 
the corresponding public key to decrypt the signature in order to get the original hashed 
data, say HI. The receiver now produces another hashed data using the same plain text 
as the sender, say H2. By checking whether the two hashed data, HI and H2, are equal 
or not, the receiver can verify whether the message has been "properly signed". Digital 
signature, thus, provides authentication and data integrity features since a digital 
signature can only be produced using its owner's private key. Besides, a digital signature 
also provides the non-repudiation feature because the sender cannot deny his/her signed 
document using his/her private key. 
Plain text Plain text  
Hash function • 
5 r  
I Hash 
Hash I 
^ ^ Same? 
, S i g n (encrypt/ Private \ f P u b l i c �V e r i f y (dec ryp t ) : ‘ 
J r  
Signature — • Signature 
Data transmission 
Figure 1.6: Digital signature 
A digital certificate is used to ensure that the entity's public key belongs to the 
entity it claims to be. There are four main fields in a digital certificate. The first one is 
the owner's identity that stores the related owner information. The second one is the 
owner's public key. The third one stores the certificate authority's (CA) information. 
The last one is the CA's signature that is produced by signing CA's private key on the 
hashed owner's information as shown on the left of Figure 1.7. A CA is a trusted party 
who is responsible to generate public keys for verified owners. One party can verify 
another one by CA's public key as shown on the right of Figure 1.7. 
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( 1 
I ： 
Digital certificate ~ ‘ “ 
丨 Hash by hash 
Hash by hash ^ ^ Owner information function function  Owner public key j  
i The same? 
S i p e d b y C A CA information ~ t  
private key “ 
CA Signature _ ^ Verified by CA 
1 public key (third 
！ 丨 party)  
Figure 1.7: Digital certificate 
The above four main components in a PKI system provide a complete framework 
for various security applications. Each party using this framework can communicate 
with the others in the secure channel. In the next chapter of this thesis, we will discuss 
the advantages and disadvantages of different authentication techniques that can be 
applied to mobile commerce applications. 
r 
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2. Mobile authentication using Fingerprint 
2.1 Authentication basics 
Authentication is an important procedure in a secure transaction. If the 
authentication layer of the system is not reliable, even strongly encrypted data can 
become useless because no reliable identification of the involved parties can be made. In 
this way, an unauthorized party may have chance to attack valuable information. 
Although PKI can help us to solve different security requirements (which are mentioned 
in chapter one), it cannot replace the need for secure authentication mechanism. The 
reliability of PKI is strongly dependent on the authentication mechanism. 
The protection of the private key is very important in PKI because the private key is 
used for identifying the party involved in a transaction. If we do not have a suitable 
authentication mechanism to protect the private key, PKI can become untrustworthy 
since anyone can copy the private key and pretend to be the owner in order to conduct a 
transaction. 
Modem authentication mechanisms are based on three common design 
considerations: "Something-You-Know" (knowledge factor), "Something-You-Have" 
(possession factor) and “Something-You-Are (biometric factor)" [44][4][61]. 
A "Something-You-Know" architecture refers to remembering some passwords or 
PINs. A lot of applications, like ATM card and e-banking, use this strategy nowadays. In 
this model, a secret password is shared between the user and the host. The advantage is 
that the implementation of this architecture is not complicated and it can be easily 
integrated into different applications. However, the disadvantage is that the whole 
authentication relies only on the password. If the user discloses the password 
accidentally, an unauthorized person can steal the owner's identity easily. Moreover, 
passwords made up of strings of numerals and characters that can be guessed by try-and-
error. Moreover, since passwords are stored in a security system, the system shares some 
security responsibility. Cases exist in the past where systems were attacked and 
passwords were stolen. 
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Different from the "Something-You-Know" architecture, the "Something-You-
Have" architecture refers to some physical objects that the user owns. Those physical 
objects include hardware token cards or software digital certificates. The 
implementation of a hardware token method is often used with a hardware card, e.g. a 
smart card. The smart card stores the key used for authenticating its owner. A smart card 
reader is needed for reading information from smart card and sending the information to 
a host computer. Although it is difficult to attack the information stored inside a smart 
card [47]，information can be stolen during the data transmission to/from the smart card 
reader from/to the host. Therefore, some smart cards are capable of applying encryption 
to its data for protection during transmission. This authentication technique is more 
secure than the "Something-You-Know" architecture because an unauthorized person 
will have to steal or duplicate the certificate or hardware token before he or she can 
access the valuable information. The software certificate may also be stolen if the user's 
PC is hacked. As a result, the host can only identify the mathematically strong objects 
[44] assigned to the users but not the users themselves directly! 
The last authentication mechanism depends on some biometric features, like 
fingerprint, face, iris, voice, etc. of a user. It is a strong authentication technique because 
only the owner possesses the biometric features himself assuming unique physical 
characteristics of a human body. It is very difficult for an unauthorized person is very 
difficult to forge or duplicate the same features belonging to a user. Traditionally, 
biometric data processing, which is usually considered as a branch of signal processing, 
requires extensive computation in order to achieve accuracy and reliability. Fingerprint 
authentication is one of the most popular and mature techniques [35][43][33] among all 
biometric authentication. techniques. Numerous biometric researches have been 
conducted in fingerprint authentication. New technologies based on electronic 
capacitance, pressure, thermal radiation have enabled the production of many low cost 
and small fingerprint sensors. Thus, fingerprint authentication will become one of the 
most popular techniques deployed to the mobile applications in the future. 
As mentioned above, there are three main types of authentication factors. An 
authentication process can combine different factors to achieve better security. For 
example, an authentication system can use a smart card together with biometrics. If a 
user cannot present his/her smart card and validate himself/herself through biometric 
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tests, he/she will be rejected by the authentication system. This type of system is called 
hybrid architecture. Hybrid design provides a flexible architecture in which different 
security techniques are fused together to achieve a better security. With the combination 
of strong authentication technology and PKI, a high level of security in mobile 
commerce can be achieved. In this thesis, we will focus on the investigation of such a 
development. Therefore, we will introduce the fingerprint biometric knowledge in the 
next section. 
2.2 Fingerprint basics 
A fingerprint matching system contains several components. Its operations are 
made up of two phases, the enrolment phase and the authentication phase. Figure 2.1 
shows a generic fingerprint matching system. 
！ Enrolment phrase 丨 丨 | 
j User database 丨 | 
I j Store the feature I I 
I Fingerprint Image Feature and associate it j ！ 
I image capture preprocessing ~ • extraction + • with a unique ED ! | 
I Authentication phrase | 
I y I 
i Fingerprint Image Feature Feature Matching ; 
I image capture preprocessing extraction matching —• result I 
• Figure 2.1: Fingerprint matching system 
The enrolment phase contains four stages: fingerprint image capture, image pre-
processing, fingerprint feature extraction and fingerprint registration. Fingerprint image 
capture refers to the capturing of a user's fingerprint from a fingerprint sensor. There are 
different kinds of fingerprint sensors. The physical size, fault tolerance and resolution of 
a sensor characterize its properties as well as the main features for evaluation. Image 
pre-processing refers to the enhancement of a fingerprint image. It is an image 
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processing technique to improve the quality of the image like contrast adjustment and 
feature reconstruction. Fingerprint feature extraction is a mathematical process applied 
to a fingerprint image. This process extracts the unique features from the captured 
fingerprint image. Feature extraction is an important step because it is closely related to 
the accuracy of the authentication system. The last step is fingerprint registration. It adds 
a user's unique features to the database and assigns a unique ID to the corresponding 
record. 
The authentication phase contains five steps. The first three steps are similar to the 
enrolment phrase. The fourth step is feature matching in which the system retrieves the 
registered fingerprint features from the database and compares it with the features 
extracted from a live fingerprint template. In the last step, the system calculates the 
matching result so as to determine whether the two templates belong to the same person 
or not. 
In a lot of fingerprint systems, the matching result is represented by a score, say 
zero to hundred. The threshold score value for matching the fingerprints are often 
determined by the calculation of False Rejection Rate (FRR) and False Acceptance Rate 
(FAR) [1]. FRR is the rate of rejecting authorized users. FAR is the rate of accepting 
unauthorized users. To analyse the characteristic of FRR and FAR, a fingerprint 
database is needed to evaluate the fingerprint verification algorithm. The test result can 
be regarded as a reference to measure the security level of the system. 
As we have mentioned above, feature extraction is the process that is closely related 
to the accuracy of a fingerprint verification system. Therefore, we must extract the 
features of the fingerprint accurately. A fingerprint feature is the characteristic of 
ridgelines on the finger so that each finger has its unique set of features [49]. As there 
are noise and distortion when capturing a fingerprint image, direct comparison of two 
fingerprint images using cross-correlation is not practical. Hence, special information 
that will not be influenced too much by noise and distortion has to be selected from a 
fingerprint image. These features include core point, orientation field and minutiae. A 
core point is the uppermost point of the innermost curving ridge as shown in Figure 2.2. 
Most fingerprint images will only contain one core point so that it can be used for 
fingerprint alignment. An orientation field is the directional structure of the ridgeline on 
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the fingerprint image as shown in Figure 2.3. Minutiae are the ridgeline termination or 
bifurcation. The end of a ridgeline forms a termination and the merge of two ridgelines 
forms a bifurcation as shown in Figure 2.2. The matching of two fingerprint images is 
the calculation on the similarity of those fingerprint information. 
^ ^ (a) Termination 
^ I (b) Bifurcation ~ 
Figure 2.2: (a) Termination (a) Bifurcation (c) Core point 
_ 
I • 1  一 一 „ 
Figure 2.3: Orientation field 
There are two types of fingerprint systems, identification and verification systems. 
In identification, a database is needed to store the minutiae information of all pre-
registered users. When a user presents his or her fingerprint on the sensor, the system 
extracts the features and identifies the matched fingerprint in the database. It is a one to 
N matching problem. In verification, the system verifies the fingerprint of the user that 
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he or she claims to be. Before a user presents his or her fingerprint, he or she needs to 
inform the system his or her own identity to be verified by the system. In this way, 
fingerprint verification is a one to one matching and the procedure is much simpler than 
identification. 
2.3 Fingerprint authentication using mobile device 
The process of fingerprint authentication and the characteristic of mobile device 
cause a great challenge to the deployment of fingerprint authentication system on mobile 
devices. Fingerprint feature extraction is a complicated process that involves a lot of 
mathematical calculations. The process can be divided into several parts [34]. They are 
image enhancement, image segmentation and orientation, core point location and 
minutiae extraction. 
(a) Image enhancement/filtering 
This part aims at enhancing the image quality before feature extraction. Common 
techniques like the application of a directional filter [29] and image normalization [22] 
are often employed. 
(b) Image segmentation and orientation 
This part computes the orientation of the fingerprint image and identifies the 
Region of Interest (ROI) [21]. 
(c) Core point location 
This part locates a core point [5] for fingerprint alignment and matching. It is 
computed from the orientations of the ridgelines obtained from step (b). 
(d) Minutiae extraction 
This part traces the ridgeline with the helps of orientation information and finds 
out the bifurcation and termination features. 
In general, the authentication process is an n^ process, assuming that fingerprint is 
an n by n (pixel) image. Steps (a) to (d) involve intensive floating-point calculations, 
especially approximations of trigonometric functions. 
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Although the fingerprint authentication process is complicated, it can run on 
desktop PC in real time because desktop PC has a very fast processing speed. We do not 
need much optimisation before constructing the verification software. However, when 
the authentication process executes in a mobile device, the situation becomes different 
because the software and hardware design of mobile device are quite different from the 
desktop PC [30]. Devices such as mobile phones and Personal Digital Assistants 
(PDAs) share a number of unique features and limitations. They include processing 
power, floating-point computation capability, battery and other physical constraints. 
Processing power 
With the advancement in electronics technology, the computational capability of 
mobile devices increases exponentially, enabling them to execute a wide range of 
applications. An embedded processor with large market share is the ARM [57][55]，a 
RISC [45] based processor. Table 2.1 shows the speed comparison on different ARM 
based embedded processors. From the table, we can observe that even the speed of the 
fastest embedded processor is only comparable to speeds of some very obsolete desktop 
processors. The speed limitation is due to the consideration of power consumption and 
heat dissipation on a mobile device. The power consumption of desktop processor is 
quite large when comparing with an embedded processor. Therefore, the battery of a 
mobile device cannot meet such demands. Besides, the heat dissipation of desktop 
processors is very high and it is senseless to add a fan on a mobile device. Therefore, 
desktop processors are not suitable for mobile devices. 
Processor/Family Production Year Clock MHz 
ARM7 • 100-133 
ARM9 2000 180-250 
StrongArm 2000 206 
XScale 2002 400-1000 
Table 2.1: ARM architecture embedded processor speed comparison table 
Floating-point co-processor 
A floating point co-processor is a dedicated processor for floating arithmetic 
calculations such as floating addition, floating substraction, sine, log and etc. It operates 
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together with the main processor and is actually resident in desktop PC processor. But 
the floating-point co-processor is a luxury in a mobile device because the extra co-
processor draws substantial extra power from the battery. Therefore, most embedded 
processors do not have hardware floating-point units. Instead, software floating-point 
arithmetic is used. 
There are two methods in handling software floating-point. They are software 
emulation and software library [37]. In the software emulation approach, when floating-
point is detected during compilation, the compiler will automatically generate assembly 
code to emulate specific floating-point co-processor hardware. The advantage of this 
design is that the software emulator supports all the floating-point operations available 
in the emulated hardware. In the software library approach, all the required floating-
point mathematical operations are simulated using integer operations. When a 
programmer encounters a floating-point operation, he or she will make a function call to 
a floating point library instead. The advantage of this design is that we can customize 
the simulation software for an embedded system. Both approaches are also very popular 
for an embedded system and the software developers can make their own choice 
depending on their applications. 
Battery 
Battery technology development advances at a rate far slower than the processing 
units in mobile devices [50]. When more advanced functions are added to the mobile 
devices, including the multimedia and biometric applications, battery capacities hardly 
seem enough for the mobile devices. Therefore, some battery driven system design 
methodologies have been developed [27] to increase the battery capacity of the device. 
In such a design, the efficiency is closely related to the power drawing procedures. 
Physical constraints 
The portable feature of a mobile device limits its size and weight. These constraints 
cause lots of restriction in the design of a mobile device. The display needs to be small 
due to its physical size. Extra peripherals such as external sockets, network modules are 
also limited. 
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As discussed above，fingerprint authentication is a challenge to mobile devices. 
When implementing such an application in an embedded device, we encounter 
difficulties due to slower CPU speeds, absence of cache and most important of all, 
absence of a floating-point unit. While optimising the authentication, we cannot afford 
to sacrifice reliability. Thus, a fast, low cost and accurate methodology must be 
developed for fingerprint matching for embedded applications. In the next chapter, we 
will discuss the methodology on how to design a mobile fingerprint authentication 
device. 
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3. Design of Mobile Fingerprint Authentication Device 
3.1 Objectives 
Before we design the hardware and software components of a mobile device, we 
have to determine the application requirements. In a fingerprint system, as mentioned 
above, the system can be divided into identification and verification applications. 
Identification application identifies a person from a group of individuals. The size of 
database can range from a few persons (home use) to hundreds of persons. The 
performance of such a system is database size dependent. Access control (e.g. door lock) 
is a typical identification example. Figure 3.1 shows the block diagram of a common 
access control system. Enrolment is conducted when a user first registers a fingerprint in 
the system. The core part of the system is the authentication device. It needs to handle 
different connections such as Ethernet, RS232 and Wiegand (an industrial standard 
security protocol sending bit strings of specified length and content) to communicate 
with the enrolment machine, database server and security controller. 
‘ Fingerprint 
authentication device  
(fingerprint sensor) Fingerprint 
Z database server 
Fingerprint L r ^ t h e m e t 
enrolment machine 
(core processor) ^ L � 
Wiegand 
] r  Security Controller • Door Lock 
Figure 3.1: Block diagram of physical access control system 
With the limited features of a mobile device, it is difficult to conduct identification 
using slow speed CPU in a very large database. To solve this problem, we can use a 
smart card. Every user in the system is issued with a smart card in which his identity is 
stored. When the system needs to verify a user, the user needs to present his smart card 
and verify his identity using his fingerprint. With this approach, the mobile 
authentication device does not need to perform one to N matching. Figure 3.2 shows the 
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block diagram of a fingerprint and smart card authentication system. Similar to Figure 
2.1，this figure also contains enrolment phase and authentication phase. In enrolment 
phase, the features of the captured fingerprint will be extracted and registered in the 
smart card. In authentication phase, the live fingerprint template will be transferred and 
matched with the pre-registered one in the smart card. Since this approach is more 
practical for mobile device, we decided to adopt this approach in our implementation. 
Capture user Features Store feature template 
fingerprint extraction ~ • to smart card  
1 Match live 
Enrolment phase i template with 
Smart card ^ the one inside 
Authentication phase smart card 
User Capture user's Features Transfer live 
presents ~ • live fingerprint ^ extraction template to smart 
smart card ^^ ard 
Figure 3.2: fingerprint and smart card authentication system 
Like other embedded systems, the design of a mobile personal fingerprint 
authentication device requires the consideration of cost, development time and runtime 
performance. Since real time response is a critical factor in this case, we will focus on 
the searching of an appropriate implementation strategy that can yield such 
performance. 
Before we design the mobile device, we need to understand what an embedded 
system is. In [65], Wolf defines an embedded system as "Any sort of device which 
includes a programmable computer but itself is not intended to be a general-purpose 
computer is said to be an embedded system." Traditionally, an embedded system is 
often regarded as a micro controller residing in a special purpose device. Because of its 
dedicated purpose(s) and limited resources, there is limited or even no operating system 
support. In the event that extensive computation is required, a dedicated processor [24] 
is also included to ensure a satisfactory performance. Such systems can be found in 
numerous industrial applications, particular in the area of control engineering. With the 
advancement in semi-conductor technology and operating system miniature, we are 
seeing the births of new kinds of embedded systems. A glance of an embedded Linux 
web site clearly reveals this [32]. Embedded systems have been widely used in factories 
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and even offices and households. Well known examples include set-top-boxes and 
routers. The advent in personal and mobile computing has pushed embedded systems 
further to the personal applications. Mobile telephones, personal digital assistants are 
some typical examples. In short, embedded systems have quickly become a part of 
modem man's life. 
3.2 Hardware and software design 
Designing an embedded system involves both a hardware part and a software part. 
The hardware part includes the core hardware platform that the system used. It can be 
the choice of processors, memories and other related peripherals. The software part is 
the design of software layer(s) implemented in the embedded system. The software 
architecture needs to be designed carefully because it affects the efficiency of the whole 
system. It controls the processor and memory resources as well as the communication 
protocols between the processor and the peripherals. Therefore, a bad design will affect 
the stability and reliability of the system. 
3.2.1 Choice of hardware platform 
When developing an embedded application, there are a number of choices of the 
type of processors. Those domain specific processors [31] can be generally divided into 
three areas [46]，System-on-Chip Processor, Digital Signal Processor and Application 
Specific Integrated Circuit Processor. 
a) System-on-Chip (SoC) Processor 
In the past, embedded applications used an 8-bit micro-controller as the core part 
of the design. An 8-bit processor micro-controller is designed for low-cost applications 
such as servomotor control and simple robot control. Today, the 8-bit processor is still 
very popular for low-end applications because they are relatively cheap and easy to 
control. With more advanced applications deployed by the embedded systems, an 8-bit 
processor seems to be too slow to support the advanced applications. Therefore, a new 
technology embedded processor is being developed to suit the applications. We call it a 
System-on-Chip (SoC) processor. SoC will play an important part in the next generation 
of computing. It is a new type of hardware architecture with complex hardware that 
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integrates with different Intellectual Property (IP) cores. As shown in Figure 3.3, the IP 
cores may include SDRAM controller, peripheral I/O controller, Ethernet controller, 
LCD interface and etc. Those IP cores communicate with the Central Processing Unit 
(CPU) via internal bus. The variety of IP cores allows a single SoC to be programmed 
for different applications. The new architecture of SoC enables the reusability of 
hardware modules and therefore shortens the design time for new systems. In fact, a 
SoC processor is similar to a general-purpose desktop processor without floating-point 
support because of cost and power consumption considerations. The requirement that 
that all processes be performed on a SoC helps to reduce power consumption, minimize 
chip areas and simplify the hardware and software development process [46]. 
CPU  
^ SDRAM Controller ) 
Interrupt controller  
I - Real-Time Clock  nC Interface I 
LCD Interface  -( General Purpose  
Ethernet Controller J 
� UART  • I 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Figure 3.3: Architecture of SoC processor 
In SoC circuit design, system complexity will grow faster than Very Large Scale 
Integrated (VLSI) circuit [26] complexity because the functionality of embedded system 
based on SoC can be implemented in software. With the help of software 
implementation, a SoC can deploy to different applications. Let us take the ARM 
[19] [18] series of processors as an example. They are 32-bit RISC processors with 
pipelined features. One of the famous ARM-based processors is the Intel PXA250 
application processor. This SoC is equipped with an Intel XScale core microprocessor 
with different IP cores. It can be used for embedded system with a higher performance, 
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lower power consumption and on-the-fly frequency scaling functionality [18]. The on-
chip controllers can increase the communication performance between the core 
processor and the peripherals and hence reduce the overhead on the design of the 
hardware architecture of the embedded systems. With such design, the PXA250 can be 
deployed to different areas of embedded application that range from personal devices, 
such as MPS player, handheld device, to advanced applications on network routers, 
automobile and high speed cell-phone [14]. 
b) Digital Signal Processor (DSP) 
DSP is a processor that targets on dedicated application (target on algorithm) with 
low cost and power consumption. It contains specialized hardware for fast computation 
and parallel programming. DSP usually deals with arithmetic manipulation such as 
multiplication and addition. Since these two operations often occur simultaneously, as 
shown in Figure 3.4，it has to include a parallel hardware so that multiplication and 
addition can perform in parallel way. This design will significantly increase the speed of 
the DSP for arithmetic operations. Besides, it can be equipped with different memories 
and bus architectures targeting high performance, extremely low cost and low power 
[46]. 
address generation lots of registers V signal in 
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f other DSP 
Figure 3.4: General architecture of a DSP [8] 
There are quite a lot of applications that are using DSPs nowadays. Therefore, they 
are still important components in today's embedded systems. DSP is usually used in 
data domain systems. It is often used in applications in which data transport is the 
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dominant requirement. When a data stream enters, the DSP needs to process and give 
result immediately. If the hardware is not fast enough, significant loss of data will occur 
and the system will fail. Application examples are multimedia decoding and 
telecommunication. They require the process of input stream and give output 
immediately. This type of application has a demand for high computation performance 
on high throughput rather than short latency deadline. Besides, DSPs are also used in 
applications that often involve a lot of arithmetic calculations, such as communications, 
audio and video processing, GPS and navigation. With the use of DSP for dedicated 
processing, the runtime performance of the embedded application can be greatly 
improved. 
The speed of a DSP has exponentially increased in the past 20 years [8]. The typical 
representatives of DSPs are those from Texas Instruments (TI). Both the TI C5000 [59] 
and C6000 series [60] are widely used in the industry. A C5000 series DSP is equipped 
with a 16-bit fixed-point processor. It is widely used in low-end applications such as 
MP3 encoding/decoding algorithm. For the C6000 series DSP processors, they support 
hardware caching and floating-point operations to increase the flexibility and 
f 
performance for the high-end applications such as complex image processing algorithm, 
c) Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) 
ASIC is a chip that can be designed by an engineer with no particular knowledge 
of semi-conductor physics or semi-conductor process. It is an integrated circuit designed 
for a specific task. There are two types of ASIC, Field Programmable Gate Array 
(FPGA) and Standard Cells. A FPGA design allows more flexibility for changes and 
faster turnaround time. As the hardware itself can be programmable for different logics, 
development and feedback time can be cut short. But the cost of FPGA is expensive 
when comparing with Standard Cells design. It is because transistors can be wasted if 
the design does not fully utilize the capabilities of a FPGA chip. 
For application design using Standard Cells, every transistor is used inside the 
hardware. The manual routing on the Standard Cells can give better utilization and 
lower cost [9]. In contrast to a FPGA design, a Standard Cells based design needs a 
longer fabrication time and therefore a lot of simulations are needed to ensure its 
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correctness. However, the production cost is relatively low when compared to FPGA 
because a smaller die size can be achieved in Standard Cells. 
We have now discussed three types of embedded system processors. Their 
performances and programmability vary according to different processors. In Table 3.1， 
it shows that ASIC has no (Standard Cells) or very low (FPGA) programmability. 
Although the runtime performance of ASIC is very high, the programmability issue 
increases its development cost for application development. In the contrast, DSP and 
SoC processor allow more programming flexibility so that they are more suitable to 
implement complex software algorithms. Therefore, we decide to conduct experiments 
on DSP and SoC processor for performance evaluation when creating our design. 
Processor type ASIC DSP SoC 
Performance High Medium Medium to Low 
Programmability None or very low Low Very high 
Table 3.1: Performance and Programmability of domain specific processor 
3.3 Experiments 
The objective of the experiments is to evaluate the runtime performance of an 
image-processing algorithm on DSP and SoC. The algorithm is a fingerprint verification 
algorithm [28][67] that involves a lot of floating-point computation. We divide the 
algorithm into four parts in order to evaluate the runtime performance of the processors. 
3.3.1 Design methodology I - DSP 
3.3.1.1 Hardware platform 
The low end DSP that we used is TI TMS320C52 fixed-point DSP. It is a C52 core 
based DSP chip for low-end device in the C5X family. It is a 16-bit fixed-point DSP 
operates on 40MIPS only. It has 544 words of on-chip data RAM and 512 words of on-
chip data/program ROM. 
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3.3.1.2 Software platform 
For software, we used the Code Composer from TI TMS320C5X DSP as the 
development platform. The Code Composer is a compiler tool to convert the C language 
to the machine language that is readable by the TMS320C5X series DSPs. It provides a 
wide range of function for DSP development such as assembly programming, address 
decoding, DSP memory resource management and etc. 
3.3.1.3 Implementation 
DSP software development can be divided into several fundamental tasks. They are 
algorithm, coding specification, compiling and optimisation, simulation, testing, 
debugging and integration [20]. Among all those tasks, we only focus on the core part. 
The core part includes algorithm compilation, optimisation and simulation. 
Our colleagues have previously developed the fingerprint verification algorithm 
[66]. In order to implement the algorithm on the DSP platform, two methods are 
available: 
a) Translate all the C source codes to assembly language manually 
This method can result in a very high performance on the fingerprint algorithm. 
However, it is a very difficult task because the translation of few thousand lines of code 
to assembly language needs lots of time and effort. Moreover, it is difficult to achieve in 
a short period of time. 
b) Translate all the C source codes to machine language under the Code 
Composer software 
To shorten the integration time, we decided to use the Code Composer so that we 
can simulate the environment of DSP code and create a task environment. With this 
approach, we can simulate the interface of other software and hardware components that 
will minimize bugs found during integration. 
Although we used the Code Composer as our development software, we still had to 
make certain modification to our software when integrating to the DSP platform. Below 
are the simple steps for migrating the fingerprint verification algorithm to DSP: 
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• Remove all the file I/O functions because the DSP does not support reading and 
writing of files. 
• In order to get the fingerprint image, we need to preload the image in the 
memory space so that it can be used during the execution of the algorithm. 
• Replace all the dynamic memory allocations to static memory allocations 
because dynamic memory allocation is a very time consumption procedure in 
DSP processing and we should avoid it in the implementation. 
• The memory of the DSP is not large enough to hold the 256x256 fingerprint 
image and therefore we should reduce the image size to 128x128 in our 
experiment. 
In order to verify the performance of the DSP on both floating-point and fixed-point 
implementations, we have implemented both approaches using the same DSP so as to 
review the effect of floating-point calculation on a DSP processor. 
3.3.1.4 Experiment and result 
Figure 3.5 shows the result on the number of instructions needed for the DSP to 
execute the core fingerprint verification modules using fixed and floating-point 
techniques. From the result, we observe that if we compile a floating-point program 
using Code Composer on a fixed-point DSP, the performance is extremely low when 
compared to fixed-point implementation. We can conclude that the performance of the 
floating-point algorithm, which is translated from the Code Composer to DSP platform, 
is not acceptable. As a result, the Code Composer can help us to shorten the 
development time, but the result may not be useful if real-time performance is required. 
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Figure 3.5: Comparison on the number of instruction on TMS320C52 of fixed and 
floating point in the approach to fingerprint verification implementation 
The total number of instructions needed for the fixed-point fingerprint algorithm is 
76774545 (-76 million) while floating-point fingerprint algorithm needed 1044426351 
(-1044 million) instructions. As the speed of the DSP is operating at 40MIPS, the time 
required for fingerprint verification is about 1.9 second and 26.1 second on fixed-point 
and floating-point implementation respectively. 
The result of this experiment shows that Code Composer cannot efficiently convert 
the floating-point algorithm for a fixed-point DSP processor. In addition, the fixed-point 
implementation needs 1.9 second for 128x128 pixels image. Real time cannot be 
achieved when using full size image (256x256 pixels). From the result, we discovered 
that the compiler for the DSP has difficulty in optimising algorithm. Manual 
modification of the algorithm, such as the involvement of assembly programming, is 
needed in order to have a better performance. 
3.3.2 Design methodology II - SoC 
3.3.2.1 Hardware components 
In SoC development, the hardware platform we chosen is Compaq IPAQ H3600 
which is a Windows CE based mobile device and we have converted it into Linux 
operating system. The IPAQ mobile device is equipped with an Intel StrongARM 
Department of Computer Science and Engineering iii 
(206Mhz) embedded processor for running the fingerprint verification algorithm in our 
system. 
3.3.2.2 Software components 
The software architecture of the SoC design can be divided into three layers, 
hardware layer, kernel layer and application layer [25]. With this approach, we can 
develop multiple applications on a single kernel for extensibility of the embedded 
fingerprint system. Besides, we can maximize the reusability on the software code. 
3.3.2.3 Implementation 
Linking the host application and hardware is the Application Program Interface 
(API). We have chosen to use embedded Linux as the operating system because its open 
source code allows us to customize the software architecture in our system. With the use 
of Linux kernel, we can standardize the API for device drivers, scheduling and 
messaging services so as to save a lot of development time and effort. 
, For the application layer, we have to port the fingerprint algorithm for the 
StrongARM platform. As mentioned before, direct cross-complication of the algorithm 
is possible but it results in poor runtime performance (greater than 20 seconds in 
verification of one single). Therefore, we started to develop a software reengineering 
process to port the software to its new environment. Basically, the re-engineering 
process is made up of five steps: 
a) Whenever possible, replace floating-point data by integers; 
b) Replace the remaining floating-point calculations by fixed-point calculations; 
c) Buffer all reusable complex calculations; 
d) Avoid the use of subroutines; 
e) Recompile using an optimised compiler. 
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3.3.2.4 Experiment and result 
The above procedure appears routine and straightforward. Yet, there are numerous 
domain specific conversions that must be aware of. In our case, the precisions of the 
fixed-point system as well as good approximations of the trigonometric functions are 
major concerns [11]. We have to be careful to ensure that the reengineered software 
yields similar results to the original software. We estimated the errors by applying the 
reengineered software to a 300-person database and analysis the resultant False 
Acceptance Rates and False Rejection Rates to make sure that they resembled those of 
the original software. The 4000 lines of C code took two to three months for 
reengineering. Ultimately, the verification time was cut to one second or less. 
It took two months to finish the cost development, porting the embedded Linux OS 
to StrongARM development board and writing drivers to interface the fingerprint 
sensors. Nevertheless, the experience and the source code are reusable. 
3.4 Observation 
‘ In the above experiments, we have made two case studies to evaluate the 
development and performance of two different DSP systems for multimedia and image 
processing applications. It seems that the DSP development requires significant 
adoption effort when porting algorithm to their platforms. Even with optimised 
compilers, assembly code implementations are still very important when optimal 
performance is sought. With the new SoC processors, which are equipped with some 
DSP-featured hardware, new strategies for designing embedded systems emerge. The 
new strategy that enables efficient development is made from the combinations of 
hardware and software technologies. With an operating system ported to the SoC 
processors, reuse of code and libraries can be achieved. This approach can separate the 
hardware design and software design of an embedded application and achieve the 
parallelism in development. 
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4. Implementation of the Device 
4.1 Choice of platforms 
After the analysis of the design requirements of our fingerprint authentication 
mobile device [40], SoC is taken as the best choice for implementation in terms of both 
hardware and software considerations. Its hardware flexibility and software 
programmability benefit the design and implementation of mobile device. With the 
flexibility from SoC design, we can extend the use of the authentication device to 
different applications like door lock systems and time attendance systems. 
4.2 Implementation Details 
4.2.1 Hardware implementation 
Figure 4.1 shows the block diagram of our mobile device. It is made up of three 
main components. The Intel Lubbock is one of the main components and it is the core of 
our base platform for development. The Atmel finger chip and the Gemplus smart card 
reader are the other two components that are added as peripherals for authentication 
purpose. 
An embBddod d6vk» hc^ tmg the smart c»n$ finoefpiln( aeflsw 
__ Frngerprint Core Point Mimftiae  I^EnroMmenl Oelecabn ExIfBdion 1 f 竺IWK>» ••_• •丨•_...-� 
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Figure 4.1: Proposed mobile device for authentication 
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4.2.1.1 Atmel FingerChip 
The finger chip operates on 3.3V with a small power consumption of 20mW with 
IMHz clock cycle. The finger chip uses the temperature difference between the sensor 
and the fingerprint to measure the data value. If the temperature difference is too small, 
a temperature stabilization feature will be activated to ensure sufficient contrast exists in 
the captured fingerprint image. 
We connect the finger chip via the GPIO of the base platform. The GPIO 
communication allows us to gain full control of the pins in order to communicate to the 
finger chip directly. Table 4.1 shows the hardware pin connections between the Atmel 
finger chip and the Lubbock device. 
L u b b o c k L E D 2 1 32 Vl [~9 [ T o V u ~ V l [ a 
GPIO 
Finger ^ PCLK D e O D e l D e 2 ~ ~ D e 3 ~ ~ D o O D o l D o 2 Do3 
chip pins: 
RST: Reset pin, PCLK: Input Clock, DeO-3: Even pixel, DoO-3: Odd pixel « 
Table 4.1: Pins connection between the Atmel finger chip and the Lubbock device 
The Reset pin of the finger chip is connected to LED21 of the Lubbock to indicate 
finger chip reset signal. As the LED operates from 1.5 V to 2V only, an extra circuit, as 
shown in Figure 4.2，is added to increase the voltage range in order to trigger the reset 
signal of the finger chip. 
— p 3 V 3 
J IkQ 
. J RST 
LED21 1 N N I 
Input M 1 / 1 \ 
200Q 
Figure 4.2: Reset pin circuit 
Department of Computer Science and Engineering 32 
4.2.1.2 Gemplus smart card and reader 
A smart card is actually a card-sized computer with a microprocessor and some 
memory chips packaged in the form of a paper card. The card can be programmed to suit 
different applications. The smart card that we use contains a Java virtual machine. It 
allows Java programs to run on a smart card, we choose an 8-bit processor with 
20Kbytes on-card memory to reduce the cost of the device. For connection, we use the 
FF serial port of the Lubbock [18] to connect smart card with it. 
4.2.2 Software implementation 
4.2.2.1 Operating System 
On the top of our hardware, we choose embedded Linux as our operating system. 
We choose Linux because it is an open source operating system. We can study the 
source code and modify it by ourselves without any restrictions. Linux is a powerful and 
sophisticated system with lots of management facilities, organized device driver layer 
and well documented. Linux contains so many features and makes it too resource 
demanding when it is ported to a mobile device. Therefore, people started to develop the 
embedded version of Linux. Embedded Linux is a trimmed down version of Linux in 
which the operating system is customized to fit most embedded system requirements. 
4.2.2.2 File System 
File system is very important to an embedded system because it stores all the 
system files and application programs in the device. There are several types of file 
systems and each of them has its advantages and disadvantages. 
a) RAMDISK 
Ramdisk [16] is a file system that represents a portion of memory as a hard 
drive. The advantage of ramdisk file system is that the access speed is very fast 
compared to a hard drive. The content, however, will be lost if the power of the 
device is cut off. Ramdisk is often used in the early stages of development in 
which it is often used as an INITRD [63] feature in Linux. INITRD allows a 
small file system to be loaded with the same mechanism as the procedure of 
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loading the kernel. That means if you can load the kernel to the device, you can 
also load the INITRD and the developer can test the device driver inside the 
ramdisk immediately. 
b) CRAMFS 
It is a compressed read only file system. It compresses a file one page at a time 
so that it allows random page access. It is often used in system files which 
stores read only partition to prevent the system from file corruption. 
c) JFFS2 
JFFS2 is developed from the Joumaling Flash File System (JFFS). JFFS 
provides the storage media with the crash and power down protecting 
mechanism. Besides, version two (JFFS2) supports the compression that can 
save about fifty percent of the storage space. 
After comparing the above file systems, we decided to use JFFS2. Table 4.2 shows 
the partition design in the Lubbock development board. The first partition is bootloader 
that is responsible for establishing power on communication between the host and the 
target board. The second partition is used for storing the parameters setting of 
bootloader so that we can load the setting each time we power on the board. The third 
partitions stores the Linux kernel that controls the entire device drivers. The last 
partition is the user space partition that stores all the files inside the file system. We use 
separate partition for the Linux kernel and the user file because we want to separate the 
system file from the user space. With this approach, we can easily upgrade the kernel 
without affecting the files stored inside the user space. 
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Partition name Flash address Memory address Length Entry point 
Bootloader 0x04000000 0x04000000 0x80000 0x00000000 
Bootloader 0x05F80000 0x05F80000 0x40000 0x00000000 
parameter 
Linux kernel 0x04080000 0x04080000 OxCOOOO 0x00000000 
User file 0x04140000 0x04140000 0x1200000 0x00000000 
Table 4.2: Flash drive partition design of mobile device 
4.2.2.3 Device Driver 
Device driver plays an important role in the Linux I/O system [10]. It controls all 
the hardware devices that exist in the system. A device driver provides a bridge between 
the user applications and the hardware so that the user programs can access the hardware 
with a standard API. With the device driver, the programmer can control the hardware 
without a need to fully understand the details of the hardware I/O operations. The device 
driver hides all the complicated communication. Therefore, device driver can influence 
the efficiency of the whole system if it is not well designed. Figure 4.3 shows the block 
diagram of the Linux I/O system. We can see that device driver is a layer that is the 
closest to the hardware. Any I/O from the hardware devices needs to pass through the 
driver before going to the upper software layer. 
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dependent code 
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Hardware 
, Figure 4.3: Overview of Linux I/O system 
There are three main classes of device drivers in Linux operating system. They are 
character device driver, block device driver and network device driver. 
a) Character device driver 
Hardware devices that can be accessed as characters (streams of bytes) are 
belonging to this category. Such as serial port or serial console, we can 
write/read a byte to/from those character devices. In Linux, it uses file node and 
major number [3] to represent the device. 
b) Block device driver 
Different from character device, block devices can read/write a block of data 
to/from the hardware. This type of device can usually be accessed randomly and 
cache is needed to reduce the writing cost. It uses the same mechanism as the 
character device driver to separate the different kind of devices. 
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c) Network device driver 
A network device driver is quite different from character and block device 
drivers. Linux uses name to represent different network device like ethO, ethl 
and etc. Network devices often communicate with the other hosts by 
sending/receiving package via different networks. 
In our system, there are two main hardware peripherals. They are Atmel FingerChip 
and Gemplus smart card reader. Both hardware devices need a software driver 
implementation so that it can be interfaced with the user applications. 
The Atmel FingerChip driver 
As the finger chip outputs the fingerprint image pixels as a stream of bytes, we can 
use a character driver to implement the software controller for the finger chip. Figure 4.4 
shows the block diagram of character device driver components for Atmel FingerChip. 
1. Start capturing fingerprint image 4. Get fingerprint image 
• ^ a. Initial image space 
~T~r ‘ “““ ~~~~ b. Wait until finger move 2. Open the device driver ^ ^ ^ . ‘ • 
1 ^ c. Get fingerprint image slice 
i d. Calculate displacement of 
3. Reset the finger chip ^ image slice 
e. Construct two image slices 
f. Repeat step (c) until no 
detection of moving finger 
g. Return whole image 
5. Copy data to user space ^  
6. Close the device driver 
Figure 4.4: Atmel FingerChip device driver components 
As the size of the fingerprint sensing area contains only 280x40 (width x height) 
pixels, a full image is actually obtained by joining several image slices together. The 
technique used in alignment the image slices is shown in Figure 4.5. We first calculate 
the horizontal and vertical displacement of two slices by comparing the similarity of the 
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pixel value along the alignment region. Then we reconstruct the whole image using a 
total of 11 aligned slices. 
Alignment region 
Figure 4.5: Image slices alignment technique 
The Gemplus smart card reader driver 
We do not need a device driver for the Gemplus smart card reader because it is 
directly connected to serial port in which a serial port device driver is already available 
in the standard Embedded Linux operating system. The software that we need is the 
communication protocol control software between the serial port and the smart card 
reader. The smart card we use is an ISO-7816-4 compliant smart card that is compatible 
to the PC/SC [36] standard. Therefore, we can use the free source code from [36] to 
establish the communication control between the mobile device and the smart card 
reader. 
4.2.2.4 Smart card 
In today's e-commerce world, a credit card is one of the popular payment 
methods. Many people use a credit card because it is convenient for them to make 
transactions. One disadvantage is that the storage space in credit card is very limited and 
it is impossible to store the transaction records. In addition, security protection in credit 
card is not strong enough. Credit card contains a magnetized strip that is not difficult to 
duplicate. People may use an illegal reader to read the information in the credit card and 
duplicate the information in a fault card. 
To solve the security and storage problem, a smart card is proposed to cover the 
disadvantage of a credit card. The name "smart" in smart card means it has intelligence 
to process data. A smart card is not only a memory card; it also contains a processor for 
data manipulation. 
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The type of card we chosen is Java card. Java card also contains a processor with 
Java Virtual Machine (JVM). With JVM, it is possible to execute Java bytecodes inside 
the card. Then we can write Java program and execute it inside the smart card. 
Design and implementation of the Java card 
In order to support fingerprint authentication, we need to implement some routines 
inside the Java card and hence to communicate with the host. The communication 
protocol between the host and smart card is called Application Protocol Data Unit 
(APDU). Figure 4.6 shows the general APDU command sequence. Table 4.3 shows the 
design of the Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU) inside the smart card. 
CLA I N S [ h [ ? 2 [ T c Data Le 
CLA: Application class ED 
INS: Instruction ID for specific application 
PI, P2: Specific definition for single instruction ED 
Lc: Number of bytes transfer to the smart card 
Data: Bytes sequence send to the smart card 
Le: Number of bytes return from the smart card  
‘ Figure 4.6 General APDU byte sequence 
Command CLA INS P I I T c Data [ T e ^ 
Register master 0x00 0x38 0x00 0x00 0x181 Master ^ 
fingerprint fingerprint 
template template 
Download live 0x00 0x43 0x00 0x00 0x81 L i ^ ^ 
fingerprint fingerprint 
template template 
Match live “ 0x00 0x44 0x00 0x00 …- Matched 0x02 
template with score 
master template 
Table 4.3: APDU for fingerprint matching inside smart card 
Because the storage size of a smart card is very limited, we need to compress the 
fingerprint features in the host before loading them to the smart card. The routine for 
downloading master and live fingerprint templates (features) from a host to smart card is 
trivial. We define two variables in the Java applet to store two templates. The Lc 
column of Table 4.3 shows that the size of the master template is larger than the live 
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template. This is because the master template is used for matching reference. The master 
template needs to contain more minutia information in order to yield more accurate 
matching result. In contrast, a live template will be used once only and therefore we can 
reduce the number of minutiae in the live template to achieve a faster matching and 
transferring time. 
In the fingerprint template matching routine, we need to perform a point-to-point 
matching in the smart card. This is significant because the confidential master template 
data never leaves the smart card. Each feature vector in the template contains the 
distance to the core point (r), minutiae orientation (a) and the rotated orientation (6) as 
shown in Figure 4.7. For two minutiae, if the differences of their distances and 
orientations are within some threshold values, i.e. |rl-r2| < 8 and |al-a2| < 35, they are 
regarded as matched. We will then assign marks to the matched live minutiae according 
to their Euclidean distance. Moreover, marks will be adjusted according to the 
difference between their rotated orientations. If the difference is smaller than a defined 
threshold value, i.e. |01-02| < threshold, the mark will be multiplied. [66] 
— / / Fi is the distance to core； / / h / / cci is the orientation of a minutia i 
汉2 9i is the orientation of a rotated minutia i 
Figure 4.7: Two minutiae in polar coordinates 
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We use the following routine to match two fingerprints: 
For i=l to Minutiae—Number N 
{ 一 
For j=l to Minutiae_Number N { “ 
If (orientation between minutia i and j <=35 AND 
distance to core point between minutia i and j <= 8) { 
Regard j as "Matched" . 
Mark = a fixed value - orientation x distance difference 
} 
If (rotated orientation between minutia i and j <= threshold) 
Mark is multiplied 
} 
If (more than one j ' s are marked) { 
Resolve the conflict by choosing the j with the highest mark 
} 
Delete the corresponding j in the selection set of Minutiae in the live template 
} 
r 
The matching score will be between 1 and 100. If the score is higher than a 
predefined value, the user is authenticated as the valid cardholder. Otherwise, the user 
may repeat the authentication process to verify his identity again. 
4.2.2.5 Fingerprint software 
For the fingerprint software library, we have developed a fixed-point fingerprint 
verification system [28] that can be used in embedded system applications. The software 
can be divided into two parts: feature extraction and feature matching. The feature 
extraction of the software can be either executed on a desktop PC or on the mobile 
device. 
4.2.2.6 Graphical user interface 
A Graphical User Interface (GUI) is important in our secure mobile device because 
we need to display captured fingerprint image and user messages on the LCD display of 
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the mobile device. There are several GUI toolkits available for the embedded Linux 
environment: 
a) PocketLinux 
PocketLinux is a Java based windowing system. It uses open source 
implementation of Java virtual machine, named Kaffe. The virtual machine can be 
scaled down to suit different embedded devices. It has two low level layers for handling 
framebuffer display and touch screen. On the top of the low level layers, it contains a 
PocketLinux class that has implemented its own widgets. Then it uses XML for 
programming the GUI of the display. Since Java is pretty slow even it is trimmed down, 
its runtime performance is not very efficient. 
b) Microwindows 
Microwindows aims at supporting a graphical windowing environment in an 
embedded device. It mainly contains two layers: Microwindows and Nano-X. 
Microwindows is a device dependent layer for controlling framebuffer drawing. Nano-X 
is a device independent layer that builds on top of Microwindows layer. It aims at 
providing a unique API for writing GUI. As the core of Microwindows is not designed 
very well and it causes flashing problem when we draw widgets. It is also not suitable 
for embedded device. 
c) Qt/Embedded 
QT is a windowing system providies full features including window manager, 
application launcher and input methods. The Qt/Embedded version is designed for an 
embedded device. It uses C++ language for GUI programming and abstracts the C 
object layer. Therefore, it is very efficient in running on the embedded device. 
. After the analysis on the pros and cons of different embedded GUI toolkits, we 
decide to choose QT. Although QT/Embedded have already provided a complete 
framework for embedded GUI programming, some low-level software integrations such 
as touch screen compatibility need to be redesigned in order to make it compatible for 
our device. 
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Since QT does not support the touch screen of Intel Lubbock touch screen driver, 
we need to write our own version of touch screen routine to handle the signal from the 
kernel. Figure 4.8 shows the routine for touch screen used inside QT. We define the 
structure as shown in Figure 4.9 to receive the touch screen information from the 
hardware. 
1. Open touch screen device 4. 
^ If the pressure > threshold value { 
2. Read current device status f / v e the x, y value  If we get 5 sampled x, y values { 
i Average them and return the 
3. Get the pressure and x, y position ^ averaged x, y position } 
} 
5. Close the touch screen device driver <——else { 
^ Ignore this touch event 
6. Emit the touch screen event to GUI ^ 
Figure 4.8: Touch screen interface between QT and device driver 
We use a threshold value to filter out some touch screen events because the touch 
screen is very sensitive for external signals. Noise can appear even when there is no real 
touch event. For sampling technique, we use averaging so that we can get a more 
accurate result. After we have solved the touch screen problem, we can compile the 
toolkits using the XScale compiler and QT/Embedded library is successfully integrated 
to our mobile platform. 
typedef struct { 
unsigned short pressure; 
unsigned short x; 
- unsigned short y; 
unsigned short pad; 
, unsigned short stamp; 
} TS_EVENT; 
Figure 4.9: Structure of touch screen raw data 
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4.3 Results and observations 
a) Fingerprint matching accuracy of our secure mobile device 
The accuracy of our proposed system depends on the feature extraction and 
matching processes. The feature extraction process is discussed in detail in [28]. The 
matching algorithm that is executed in a smart card is difficult to test. Therefore, we 
evaluated its performance through simulation experiments on a PC with Redhat Linux 
9.0 and JDKl.4.1 installed. A fingerprint database that contained 383 different 
fingerprints supplied the test data. Each record in the data was created when a person 
scanned his or her finger 3 times through a fingerprint sensor, resulting in 1149 
fingerprint images in total. 
The Java minutiae matching program used in this experiment was exactly similar to 
the one used in our smart card. Only byte and short Java primitive types of variables 
were used in the matching program. 
FAR and FRR curves 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I •-•-»•-.-;--- • 
- ' ' ' [ — 1 8 FAR 
0.9 — - 18 FRR -
. \ — 9 FAR 
0.8 \ / 》 ' — • 9 FRR -
n / / : ' ' 一 6 FAR 
0.7 -\1 I — 6 FRR L / _ 
！。.5- \ / -
� 4 _ \ / -
0.1 • -
0 •10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Score 
Figure 4.10: FAR and FRR curves of 6，9 and 18 matching minutiae used 
The 1149 fingerprint images were registered and their minutiae data were written 
into templates in binary format correspondingly. Using a methodology that optimises the 
number of minutiae used in a matching process [28], we varied the number of matching 
minutiae, choosing 6, 9 and 18，and obtained the False Accept Rates (FAR) and False 
Reject Rates (FRR) as shown in Figure 4.10. The results of the test on the 1149 
fingerprint images showed that the Equal Error Rates (EER) rates were about 9.6%, 
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7.9% and 7.2% when 6，9 and 18 minutiae were used for matching respectively. The test 
results are summarized in Table 4.4. 




Table 4.4: EERs of the matching algorithm against different number of minutiae 
b) Speed of the whole authentication algorithm 
In another experiment, we tested the speed of the complete authentication system. 
We used different numbers of minutiae in the matching: 9，18 and 25 minutiae. Since 
the storage requirement of each feather vector is 12 bytes and the header of each 
template (image quality, fingerprint type, number of minutiae, etc) is 17 bytes, the sizes 
of the 9，18 and 25 minutiae templates are 125, 233 and 317 bytes respectively. During 
authentication, the features are extracted in the mobile device and downloaded to the 
smart card in a 128 bytes/transfer fashion. Hence, the time of transferring a 25-minutia 
template file is about triple that of transferring a 9-minutia template file. Table 4.5 
summarized the average transfer time of different sizes of template. 
Different Template Sizes Average Transfer 
Time (s) 
9 minutiae template (125 bytes) 0.70 
18 minutiae template (233 bytes) 1.28 
25 minutiae template (317 bytes) 1.89 
Table 4.5: Average times of downloading template data to a smart card 
Different Minutiae Average Time used in matching(s) 
> used 
9 minutiae 1.10 
18 minutiae 3.28 
25 minutiae 6.49 
Table 4.6: Average matching times using different number of minutiae 
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The runtime of the matching algorithm is 0(N2), where N is the number of 
minutiae used in the matching. The average times of different minutiae used in the 
matching algorithm are listed in Table 4.6. The time for minutiae extraction is a 
function of the number of minutiae used and is less than 10 milliseconds. This amount is 
negligible when compared to the time used in data transfer and minutiae matching in the 
smart card. It is clear that the number of minutiae used greatly affects the times of 
template transfer and minutiae matching on the smart card. 
The above analysis, with experimental result support, shows that it is feasible to 
conduct the fingerprint authentication using an 8-bit smart card processor on the 
embedded Linux. The whole fingerprint authentication can be completed in around 2 
seconds in our proposed system if 9 matching minutiae. In this way, our system achieves 
the dual goals of speed and reliability. 
r 
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5. An Application Example 一 A Penalty Ticket Payment System 
(FTPS) 
5.1 Requirement 
Figure 5.1 shows the procedure for handling a traffic offence in an open street. It 
involves a driver, his driving licence, a policeman, penalty, .... The procedure is a legal 
case so that it must be handled formally. Moreover, if the offence is minor, the penalty 
can be settled by fixed sum of money. Under such a situation, monetary transfer 
becomes necessary. 
In the beginning, a driver's car is first stopped by a policeman. The policeman 
verifies the driver's identity by checking the driver's photo on the license. But at the 
same time, the driver may not know whether the policeman is genuine or not. To settle 
this matter, authentication becomes necessary. If a driver agrees to pay the penalty, 
monetary transfer becomes necessary. Such a complicated matter can be nicely handled 
using our intelligent mobile smart card reader. 
" 1. Driver stopped 
2. Show driver license 
[ 
3. Policeman verifies license 
4. Policeman informs driver his offence 
Accept with cash / \ Not accept / Accept without cash 
7 \  
5. Pay with cash card 8. Policeman station to settle manually 
- I ^  
6. Get receipt 
� ^ 
7. Policeman department 
redeems money from 
bank  • 9. Exit 
Figure 5.1: General situation when the driver involve in a traffic offence 
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5.2 Design Principles 
Before we design the penalty ticket system, we need to determine the parties 
involved in the system. There are four parties, namely, the driver, policeman, bank and 
trust organization. Figure 5.2 shows the relationships of all the parties involved in the 
penalty ticket system. The policeman carries the intelligent mobile smart card reader 
with him. The ideal intelligent mobile smart card reader should look like a PDA 
equipped with a smart card reader. From hereon, we shall refer to the device simply as a 
PDA. 
Driver smart card: Policeman PDA: 
1. Driver's digital certificate 1. Policeman's digital 
2. Driver's fingerprint < • certificate 
3. Electronic balance 2. CA's public key 
I 乂 T 
Certificate Authority Bank: 
• 1. Bank's digital certificate 
1. CA's public key 
Figure 5.2: Parties involved in FTPS 
In Figure 5.2, we can see that the Certificate Authority (CA) builds up a channel to all 
other parties. The CA is the party responsible for issuing digital certificate. It is a trust 
organization that the client can obtain a digital certificate from. When two clients invoke 
any transaction, they can verify each other by verifying their certificates issued by the 
same CA. Therefore without the certificate issued by the same CA, two parties cannot 
verify each other. In other case, it is reasonable to assume that the common CA is the 
government. 
The driver is another party invoked in the system. He is issued a driver licence that 
is a smart card containing his digital certificate, fingerprint and cash balance. Although 
the digital certificate can help the policeman to verify the validity of the smart card, the 
policeman cannot verify whether the smart card belongs to the driver or not. This is the 
basic authentication problem encountered in many different applications [13]. In order 
to verify the identity of the driver, the policeman can verify the driver's live fingerprint 
with the one registered in the smart card. Then both the identities of smart card and 
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driver can be verified. The cash balance stored inside the smart card is used for paying 
the penalty due to the traffic offence. 
The policeman is another party who issues traffic offence to the driver. The 
fingerprint sensor in his PDA is used to capture the live fingerprint from the driver. The 
PDA's smart card reader is used to accept the driver licence (smart card) from the 
driver. The PDA also contains a CA's public key for verifying the genuineness of the 
driver licence using the digital certificate stored inside the smart card. . 
The bank is the party directly responsible for handling the monetary transfer. All 
money transactions between the PDA and the smart cards are recorded in the PDA. 
After one day's work, the policeman will bring this PDA back to the police station 
where the PDA will be connected to a network that links the bank. The bank will decode 
each transaction and transfer the amount to the police's account. We will assume that 
the driver can "buy" credit in the form of electronic coins from the bank and store the 
coins in his driver licence, the smart card. When necessary and under his authorization, 
the driver can shift the coins to the policeman's PDA. 
To implement the PTPS, we need to ensure the security issues following the steps 
below: 
a) Driver verifies policeman 
In this step, the driver needs to have a secure and reliable mechanism to verify 
whether the policeman should be trusted or not. He can do this by checking the 
policeman's digital signature stored inside the PDA. This verification will be a further 
safeguard when the driver transfers electronic coins to the PDA. Figure 5.3 shows this 
normal verification procedure. 
After the transfer of the coins, the policeman's information as well as other details 
of the offence will be transferred to the driver's smart card using a MD5 hashing method 
or similar. The hashed information that is equivalent to a receipt for the penalty fee will 
be stored in the card's memory, say HI. Secondly, the CA signature will also be 
transferred to the card that will perform a RSA decryption using CA's public key to 
make sure that the receipt has been "signed" by a proper authority. Inside the card, the 
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resultant decrypted data, say H2 will be compared with HI. If HI equals to H2, it means 
that the digital certificate of the policeman is valid and he has the right to access the 
driver's smart card licence. 
Driver Policeman 
2. MD5 4 1. Policeman information 
3. Hashed � 
[Policeman  
5 RSA < 4. CA signature on 
(eA’s Hashed [Policeman information] 
, , public key)  
7. Same digest?  
i ‘ / Digit certificate 
_ / 
6. Hashed [Policeman 
information] 
Figure 5.3 Driver verifies policeman using digital signature 
Driver card Policeman 
1. Encrypted PoUceman PubKev (pre-dcfmed message) “ ^ 2. RSA decryption with  
police's private key 
3. Decrypted pre-defined message ^  
i yes 
r ^ 6. Output the message and verify by 
5. The same? | \ driver manually 
7.Reject any card access 
4. Pre-defined message (plan text) 
Figure 5.4 Driver verifies policeman using a low speed processor smart card 
Unfortunately, the above procedure is not feasible in our implementation because 
the smart card only has a 5MHz processor that is not fast enough to perform the MD5 
hashing and RSA decryption. There are some fast enough smart cards equipped with 
special built-in PKI hardware to perform those cryptographic operations. We have not 
chosen such cards because they are too expensive. Therefore, we redesign the driver 
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verification procedure in order to let a low speed processor to verify the policeman's 
PDA. 
Figure 5.4 shows the block diagram of how a driver can verify a policeman using a 
low speed smart card. To verify the policeman, it is the same as verifying whether the 
policeman has a valid private key or not. Therefore, in every driver smart card, we 
decide to add a pre-defined message that is encrypted with policeman's public key. The 
encryption is done when the smart card driver licence is created. Now, both the 
encrypted and original message chosen by the driver are stored inside the card. When 
the smart card is inserted into the policeman's PDA, the encrypted message will be 
transferred to the PDA that will decrypt the message using the police's private key and 
send the decrypted message back to the smart card. The verification procedure then is 
only a text base comparison and a 5MHz processor is capable of performing such an 
operation. If the verification fails, that means the policeman cannot present a correct 
private key and any card access will be rejected. If the verification succeeds, the 
message will be sent back to the police's PDA that will display the message to let the 
driver have a manual check of his/her own recorded message. 
This scheme can achieve the same security level as if a digital signature verification 
technology has been used. One drawback of this approach is that the driver will have to 
go to the card issuing office whenever he or she wants to use a message. 
b) Policeman verifies driver 
After the driver has successfully verified the identity of the policeman, it is the 
policeman's time to verify whether the driver card belongs to the driver. This step is 
important because the driver may present a driver card that does not belong to him. 
When issuing a new driver card to a driver, the driver needs to register his fingerprint so 
that his personal information is stored inside the driver card. No one can claim to be the 
owner of the driver smart card unless his fingerprint matches the stored record inside the 
smart card. Once the fingerprint is captured by the policeman's PDA, the fingerprint's 
features will be extracted by the PDA and sent to the smart card for matching as 
described previously. 
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c) Transfer of Payment 
After both the driver and the policeman have verified the identity of each other, the 
policeman can start preparing the offence payment. Figure 5.5 shows the block diagram 
of the payment preparation procedure. Firstly, the policeman's PDA prepares a penalty 
record by collecting information such as payment ID, driver ID, and payment amount 
from the driver smart card as well as the policeman's PDA itself. Then, the electronic 
coins inside the cash card are transferred to the policeman's PDA. If the transfer is 
successful, the PDA will encrypt the payment record using the bank's public key. There 
is an option that a tiny printer is connected to the PDA for printing a payment receipt for 
the driver. The policeman's PDA encrypt the payment information in the form of a 
receipt. 
Policeman PDA Cash card 
1. Make payment 2. Deduct value of electronic  
coins 
H — — ^ ^ ^ 一 ^ 
3. RSA -
(bank's  
public key) Bank 
i 5. Decrypt the payment using 
4. Encrypted payment • private key 
Figure 5.5 Payment preparations 
d) PDA verifies policeman 
Before the policeman can use the PDA, the policeman needs to present his 
policeman card to the PDA and to be verified using his fingerprint. This can prevent 
unauthorized person to steal the PDA for illegal use. The authentication mechanism is 
almost the same as the one in part b. 
5.3 Implementation 
To implement FTPS, we use the OpenSSL [58] as the core library and integrate it 
with the fingerprint verification and smart card modules in our secure mobile device, i.e. 
the policeman's PDA. OpenSSL is a robust open source library for the purpose of 
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cryptography operations. It provides a variety of cryptography functions that can be used 
to develop different secure applications. Famous protocols such as Secure Sockets Layer 
[54] and Transport Layer Security [62] are also supported in OpenSSL. To support the 
FTPS system, we have developed a software library on top of OpenSSL. The software 
library is divided into two core modules; they are the card module and the embedded 
device module. The card module is responsible for the handling of the digital certificate 
and the embedded device module is responsible for the cryptography operations 
conducted inside the policeman's PDA. 
a) Driver card implementation 
To support FTPS, the driver card needs to include three sources of information; 
they are the digital certificate, fingerprint and electronic balance of the driver. As we 
have already developed a smart card that support fingerprint verification (in section 
4.2.2.4), therefore we can add new modules to support the remaining functions. 
Command CLA I INS I P I I T c Data [Te 
Register master 0x00 0x38 0x00 0x00 0x181 Master …-
‘ fingerprint fingerprint 
template template 
Download live 0x00 0x43 0x00 0x00 0x81 L i ^ ^ 
fingerprint fingerprint 
template template 
Match live 0x00 0x44 0x00 0x00 …- Matched 
template with score 
master template 
Get balance 0x00 0x30 0x00 0x00 …- Balance 
Credit balance 0x00 0x32 0x00 0x00 0 x 0 2 C r e d i t ^ 
value 
Debit balance 0x00 0x31 0x00 0x00 0x02~~~Debit value —— 
New Message 0x00 0x40 0x00 0x00 0 x 1 4 P r e - d e f i n e d —— 
message 
Verify PDA 0x00 0x41 0x00 0x00 —— ^ ^ 
Put certificate 0x00 0x36 0x00 0x00 0x460 C e r t i f i c a t e ^ 
Get certificate 0x00 0x37 0x00 0x00 —— C e r t i f i c a t e 0 x 4 6 0 ^ 
Table 5.1: APDU of the driver card 
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Table 5.1 shows the APDU of the driver card. Seven operations are added to the 
smart card to support FTPS. Get balance, credit balance and debit balance commands 
are used to handle the electronic coins inside the smart card. Put certificate and get 
certificate commands are used to handle the digital certificate of the driver. New 
message command is used to update the pre-defined message (as mentioned in section 
5.2) stored inside the smart card. Verify PDA is used to verify the validity of the 
policeman PDA using the original and pre-defined message. 
b) Secure software library implementation 
We have developed the six software modules for FTPS based on OpenSSL. The secure 
software modules provide a complete secure infrastructure in our system. 
1) GEN—CERT 
This module generates a digital certificate. Before we execute this module, a 
subject file that contains the owner information is needed to construct a digital 
certificate. When this module is executed, it first generates a pair of RSA keys (public 
key and private key). Then it uses the subject file and the public key to generate the 
digital certificate. This digital certificate now contains the owner name, owner 
organization, owner public key and related information. In the last step, it converts the 
certificate to the X.509 [6][2] format. The X.509 standard is a popular standard used in 
digital certificate for representing data fields and distribution of pubic keys. With this 
module, we can generate certificates for different parties in FTPS such as driver and the 
policeman department. 
2) SIGN-CERT • 
Before a digital certificate can be used, it needs to be digitally signed by the CA. 
When this module is executed, it adds the CA's subject name to the issuer field of the 
certificate. Then it signs the certificate with the CA's private key and finally outputs the 
signed certificate to the system. 
3) ADD_INFO 
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Besides the standard data fields defined in X.509 format, we can add extra 
information to the digital certificate for specific usage. For example, in FTPS, we can 
add the driver ID to the certificate so that any modification of the driver ED will cause 
failure in verification. Data added to the certificate cannot be changed as it is encrypted 
by the CA's private key. 
4) ADD一ENCR 
This module allows the addition of encrypted message in the certificate. The 
encrypted message is mainly used for the verification of policemans's PDA in our 
system. When it is executed, it reads the plain text message and encrypts the message 
with policeman's private key. Then the encrypted message is added to the digital 
certificate using the ADD INFO module. 
5) VERIFY—PDA 
This module verifies the police PDA using the encrypted message stored in the 
driver card. When this module is executed, it reads the certificate from the driver card 
•and uses the policeman's private key to decrypt the message. The decrypted message 
will then be sent back to the driver card for in-card verification. 
6) VERIFY_DRIVER 
This module verifies the driver using the digital certificate stored inside the driver 
card. When this module is executed, it reads the certificate from the driver card and uses 
CA's public key to verify the validity of the certificate. This module only contributes 
part of the driver verification process because after the certificate verification is 
finished, the fingerprint verification process will be called by the system to verify the 
fingerprint of the driver. 
�. The above six modules are integrated into our secure mobile device to enable 
FTPS. Figure 5.6 shows the flow diagram of how a digital certificate is created for 
different parties. Firstly, the CA itself needs to generate its own certificate so that other 
parties can get the public key from that certificate for verification. This process will 
involve GEN_CERT, ADD_INFO and SIGN_CERT modules one by one. The 
certificate of policeman department will use the same procedure as CA. But for the 
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certificate of the driver, ADD—ENCRY module is needed between ADD INFO and 
SIGN CERT so that pre-defined message can be encrypted and stored inside the 
driver's certificate. 





] r  
ADD_ENCRY 
I f J  
SIGN-CERT 
y r  
Output the certificate *> • 
Figure 5.6: Certificate generation process 
Figure 5.7 shows the software and hardware architecture of FTPS in the secure 
mobile device. It describes the communication between the fingerprint and smart card 
modules with the FTPS secure modules. As shown in the diagram, we separate the 
software layer into an application layer and a library layer. The library layer contains the 
fingerprint module and smart card module. These two modules are the core software 
libraries that are responsible for communicating with the hardware device and 
conducting verification using fingerprint sensor and smart card. We separate this library 
layer from the application layer so that we can develop different applications based on 
our secure mobile device. On top of the library layer, the application layer contains all 
the related modules for FTPS. With this approach, the application development can be 
isolated from the lower layer so that we can modify the hardware layer and library layer 
without affecting the application layer. Therefore, portable application can be achieved. 
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Application layer 
PTPS main software stream 
_ _ * ^  
I VERIFY—PDA VERIFY—DRIVER 
Digital ^ J I I 
certificate J 
generation 1 ^ ^ certificate 
moHiilp, 
Y ” + 
Library layer    Smart card library Fingerprint library 
牛 个 — 
Hardware Layer 2 
Smart card Fingerprint sensor 
Figure 5.7: Software and hardware architecture of PTPS 
5.4 Results and Observation 
, Since PTPS is used in a mobile device, speed is a critical factor. Experiments on 
different modules are conducted to evaluate the performance. Figures 5.8 to 5.13 show 
the runtime performance of secure modules GEN CERT, ADD INFO, ADD ENCRY, 
SIGN—CERT，VERIFY一DRIVER and VERIFY—PDA, respectively. Each module is 
executed a hundred times and the average result is calculated. We simulate the driver 
smart card as a normal file so that we can ignore the influence of smart card I/O 
overhead. Result shows the generate certificate is the most time consuming part among 
all the secure modules, because a time consuming process, the RSA key pairs 
generation, is involved in this step. ADD INFO, ADD—ENCRY and SIGN_CERT are 
part of the certificate generation process. Those modules can achieve acceptable 
performance even if they are executed in a mobile platform (SAll lO and PXA250 
processors). As certificate generation is only executed once for issuing a new driver card 
at the beginning, it is not a must to achieve real time performance. If necessary, it can be 
done in a desktop PC for efficiency consideration. The VERIFY_DRJVER and 
VERIFY_PDA, modules are often involved because the policeman and different drivers 
need to use them for mutual authentication. The most time consuming parts of these two 
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modules are for reading and decrypting of information in certificates. Experiments show 
that these two modules can achieve real time performance in a mobile platform. 
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Figure 5.8: Performance of certificate generation in different platforms 
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Figure 5.9: Performance of adding certificate information in different platforms 
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Figure 5.10: Performance of adding encrypted information in different platforms 
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Figure 5.11: Performance of signing certificate in different platforms 
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Figure 5.12: Performance of verifying driver in different platforms 
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PUT.MSG VERIFY.MSG VERIFY_CERT RSA DECRYPTION READ.CERT 
FTPS operations 
Figure 5.14: Overall performance of FTPS 
Figure 5.14 shows the performance of FTPS in our secure mobile platform without 
file simulation. It includes the overhead of smart card I/O so that we can evaluate the 
overall system performance. PUT MSG is the time for uploading the pre-defined 
message to the driver card. VERIFY_MSG is the time for comparing the pre-defined 
message inside the driver card. VERIFY_CERT is the time for verifying the certificate. 
RSA DECRYPTION is the time for decrypting the encrypted pre-defined message and 
READ—CERT is the time for reading the certificate from the driver card. 
The results show that all the operations except READ CERT operation can execute 
in less than one second. The main overhead of READ CERT is due to the reading of 
certificate from the smart card in the PDA. The certificate is about 1120 bytes and a few 
second is needed for I/O process. The time for verifying the driver and verifying the 
policeman can be calculated by equation VI and V2 respectively. 
V1: READ 一C E R T + VERIFY 一 CERT 
=4.45 + 0.35 
=4.80s 
V2: READ 一 CERT + RSA_DECRYPTION+PUT_MSG+VERIFY_MSG 
=4.45 + 0.0558+0.23+0.1502 
=4.886 
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Although the time for both VI and V2 needs about 5 seconds, we can observe that 
the READ CERT operation is duplicated. After the driver verifies the policeman, we 
can pre-store the retrieved certificate so that it can be used in the procedure of verifying 
the driver. Therefore the actual mutual authentication time: 
4.80s + 4.886s - 4.45s = 5.236s 
In general, real time performance of FTPS in a mobile platform is shown to be 
achievable and therefore an efficient and secure mobile system is developed for 
handling traffic offence applications. 
r 
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6. Conclusions and future work 
In this thesis, we have investigated different infrastructures for constructing mobile 
payment systems. From the investigation, we observe that even if PKI is deployed to the 
payment systems, security still cannot be guaranteed if a system does not have a good 
authentication mechanism. Therefore we propose a fingerprint and smart card combined 
authentication technique in which fingerprint templates are matched inside smart card to 
protect user privacy. We studied the various methods for implementing the architecture 
using embedded systems. Through experiments, we have shown that SoC is a better 
approach for constructing our secure mobile device because SoC has the flexibility to 
support multiple and diversified applications as well as the ease to accommodate 
additional hardware devices. The whole authentication can be built using existing 
mobile platforms so that it can be integrated to the popular mobile payment systems 
very easily. 
To evaluate the performance of our designed secure mobile device, we have 
developed FTPS for use in traffic offences. The system allows a policeman and the 
' driver to settle the traffic offence payment efficiently. FTPS combines different secure 
software modules to support digital certificate, digital signature and mutual 
authentication on our proposed embedded system. Experiments were also conducted to 
evaluate the performance of FTPS. Results show that satisfactory performance can be 
achieved. 
Engineering can always be conceived as a combination of art and science to solve 
problems. In our particular case, the science aspect comes from the computer hardware, 
the system software. We have contributed the art aspect by choosing a flexible platform 
(SoC + Embedded Linux) and the application software (Fingerprint Verification, Smart 
Card Programming, PKI Programming, System Integration) to solve a very difficult 
problem (Personal Authentication for Mobile Payment). Our contribution is obvious 
from our demonstrable results. 
Because of advancement in technologies and the emergence of new artful concepts, 
engineering design never stops. Such advancements, in turn, impact our software design. 
In future work, we can foresee at least improvement in two areas. First, redesign the 
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secure mobile device so that its physical size can be further reduced to a portable 
version. Secondly, redesign of the complete system using the concept of hardware and 
software co-design for the embedded system. We will pause here. 
r 
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